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eJurisprudence and the Problem of  Church Doctrine
by Nathan B. Oman
Mormons frequently refer to “Church Doctrine” in their theological discussions. For example, Sister Smith might express her belief  that the earth is no more than ﬁve or six thousand 
years old and that the theory of  evolution is a Satanically inspired plot. 
Brother Young responds by noting, “Those are just your opinions. That 
is not Church Doctrine.” Whatever else the term Church Doctrine 
might mean in this exchange, it is clearly functioning as a theological 
authority, delineating those beliefs that have a claim on Brother Young 
from those that do not. Like most Mormons, Brother Young seems to be 
conceptualizing Church Doctrine as some set of  authoritative teachings 
promulgated by the Church1 that it is possible to identify. Yet how we 
differentiate between Church Doctrine and mere opinion is unclear. I 
argue that we can analogize the problem of  “What is Church Doctrine?” 
to the jurisprudential problem of  “What is the law?” The answers offered 
by the philosophy of  law to the second of  these questions illuminates the 
sorts of  answers that we can give to the ﬁrst. Ultimately, I conclude that 
we discover Church Doctrine not by application of  any hard and fast rule 
that allows us to identify it but rather through a process of  interpretation. 
This approach to Church Doctrine, in turn, throws new light on two 
persistent issues in Mormon thought: the relationship between authority 
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and independent moral judgment, and the way in which Mormons 
interpret their own past. 
Consider the example of  the Roman Catholic Church. Like the Church, 
Roman Catholicism has an integrated ecclesiastical structure with a strong 
emphasis on authority. Were one interested in the “Church Doctrine” 
of  Roman Catholicism, one would consult the Catechism of  the Catholic 
Church. This is a volume of  864 pages promulgated in 1992 by Pope John 
Paul II which sets forth the ofﬁcial doctrine of  Roman Catholicism.2 The 
Church has no analogous volume. In the nineteenth century, John Jacques 
attempted to synthesize Church Doctrine into a Mormon catechism, but 
his work did not survive and has garnered few imitators in the century or 
more since it was published.3 More recently, Elder Bruce R. McConkie 
attempted a complete synthesis of  Church Doctrine in his book Mormon 
Doctrine, but the only thing that seems clear about the doctrinal status of  
that work is that it is not ofﬁcial Church Doctrine.4 
In an age of  correlation, we seem to have an easy solution to the 
problem of  what is Church Doctrine. Church Doctrine is simply whatever 
is published by the Church, perhaps subject to the caveat that it has been 
properly correlated. Let’s call this the correlation argument. This is where 
our ﬁrst analogy from the philosophy of  law appears. During the ﬁrst 
half  of  the twentieth-century a group of  American thinkers known as the 
legal realists adopted a similarly functional answer to the question, “what 
is the law?” As one representative scholar in the movement wrote:
[D]oing something about disputes . . . is the business of  law. And 
the people who have the doing in charge, whether they be judges or 
sheriffs or clerks or jailers or lawyers, are ofﬁcials of  the law. What 
these ofﬁcials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself.5
Hopefully the analogy to the correlation argument is clear. Just as in the 
realist view law is simply what the judges do, in the correlation argument 
Church Doctrine is simply what correlation says. The correlation argument, 
however, suffers from precisely the same problem as the realist conception 
of  law. One cannot say that the law is simply what the judges do, because 
the judges themselves look up the law and try to follow it in rendering 
their decisions. Accordingly, law as what the judges do runs into a hopeless 
problem of  circularity. The problem with the correlation argument – and 
with most other arguments that seek to identify Church Doctrine as 
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simply “what X person says” – is that those on the correlation committees 
(and others who speak for the Church) look to Church Doctrine as the 
governing standard of  what they are doing. In other words, in the best of  
all possible worlds correlated Church statements are not Church Doctrine 
because they are correlated. Rather they are correlated to conform with 
Church Doctrine. This assumes, however, that Church Doctrine exists as 
some body of  identiﬁable, authoritative teachings independent of  correlation 
or whoever else is expounding it. My point is not that Church Doctrine doesn’t 
exist or that it somehow lacks authority. Nor is my point even that we 
are incapable of  identifying clear instances of  Church Doctrine. The 
claims that Jesus Christ is the savior of  mankind and that good Latter-
day Saints should not drink coffee are both uncontroversial instances of  
Church Doctrine. My point is that identifying the full contours of  Church 
Doctrine presents a puzzle; a puzzle that legal philosophy can assist us in 
untangling.
JURISPRUDENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF 
CHURCH DOCTRINE
Jurists and political philosophers tend to ask different questions about the law. Political philosophers are largely concerned with justiﬁcation. 
They tend to assume that the question of  what the law is is relatively 
simple, and they want to spend their time thinking about what sorts of  
laws are justiﬁed. Jurists, in contrast, know from experience that the 
contours of  the law are frequently unclear and determining what the law 
is can be as difﬁcult as determining whether it is justiﬁed. Ultimately, the 
jurists’ questions are of  more use for thinking about how we discover 
Church Doctrine than the political philosophers’ questions. This is 
because rather than seeking to determine the extent to which the law’s 
authority is justiﬁed, the jurists seek to determine how far the law’s claim 
of  authority extends. It is this focus on form over substance that makes 
the juristic arguments useful for thinking about Church Doctrine. This 
is because the question of  how we identify Church Doctrine is a formal 
question rather than a substantive question. We are not interested in what 
Church Doctrine ought to be but rather in what it actually is. Consider 
analogies to three jurisprudential theories: natural law, legal positivism, 
and law as integrity.
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The idea of  natural law makes its entrance into legal philosophy in 
the work of  the ancient Stoics, and since that time the term has followed 
so many twists and turns and taken on so many different meanings and 
nuances that it is dangerous to speak of  the natural law account of  the 
law. Forced to hazard a brief  deﬁnition, however, I think that the core 
of  natural law can be stated as the claim that law is deﬁned in terms of  
what is actually morally justiﬁed. Perhaps more importantly, natural law 
involves a very strong negative claim, namely that a command or rule that 
is immoral, no matter how ofﬁcial looking, is not law. Sufﬁce it to say that 
this is a gross over-simpliﬁcation, and that natural law does not simply 
identify law and morality. Natural law thinkers acknowledge that law has 
certain social and institutional aspects – for example enforcement – but 
what they deny is that it can be deﬁned purely by reference to its social 
aspect.
What would an analogous theory of  Church Doctrine look like? 
Joseph Smith once declared, “One of  the grand fundamental principles 
of  ‘Mormonism’ is to receive truth let it come from whence it may,”6 
and Brigham Young taught, “‘Mormonism’ embraces all truth that is 
revealed and that is unrevealed, whether religious, political, scientiﬁc, or 
philosophical.”7 Brigham, I take it, is making a claim about the contours 
of  Mormonism properly understood, rather than about the status of  the 
society of  Deseret in the nineteenth century (or the society of  the Wasatch 
Front in the twenty-ﬁrst century, for that matter). Mormonism, on this 
view, is co-extensive with truth. Applying this notion to Church Doctrine, 
we would say that Church Doctrine is that which is true. In other words, 
truth acts as our criteria for identifying Church Doctrine. Just as natural 
law identiﬁes law with morality, a natural law approach to the question 
of  what is Church Doctrine identiﬁes it with truth. There is an appealing 
audacity and expansiveness to this approach, but unfortunately it suffers 
from some basic problems. 
Saying that Church Doctrine is simply coextensive with what is true 
cannot make sense of  some very basic ways in which the concept is used. 
Consider, once more Sister Smith’s claims about the age of  the earth. 
Imagine that Brother Young’s reaction – “That is just your opinion. It is 
not Church Doctrine” – is prompted by the fact that he is uncertain about 
the age of  the earth. There would be nothing shocking about Brother 
Young’s invocation of  Church Doctrine in such a situation. Faced with a 
doubtful situation, he is using Church Doctrine to conﬁrm the legitimacy 
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of  his doubt. He is not required by its authority to assent to Sister Smith’s 
position. Furthermore, it is precisely because Brother Young seems to 
know the contours of  Church Doctrine that he knows that he is under no 
obligation to accept Sister Smith’s claims. Yet if  Church Doctrine were 
truth, in identifying its contours he would necessarily have laid to rest any 
doubts as to Sister Smith’s position. Indeed, placing it outside of  Church 
Doctrine would be tantamount to claiming that it was false. Yet this is 
precisely what our doubtful Brother Young refuses to do.
The problem of  Church Doctrine as truth is further undermined if  we 
believe – as I think we are required to do – that there are issues about which 
Church Doctrine is silent. For example, I take it to be fairly uncontroversial 
that there is no Church Doctrine on the precise location of  Williamsburg, 
Virginia. Somewhat more controversially, one can plausibly (and correctly 
in my view) claim that there is no Church Doctrine on the truth or falsity 
of  the theory of  evolution.8 No one could plausibly argue, however, that 
because of  this, no statement about the location of  Williamsburg, Virginia 
(or the theory of  evolution) could be true or false. The statement that 
“Williamsburg, Virginia is located on the banks of  the Potomac River” is 
clearly false, the silence of  Church Doctrine notwithstanding. Nor does 
it make sense of  our ordinary usage of  the term Church Doctrine to say, 
“It is Church Doctrine that Williamsburg, Virginia is on the York-James 
Peninsula.” One might try to save the Church Doctrine as truth approach 
by reﬁning it somewhat, saying that Church Doctrine is any truth that is 
taught by or in the Church. The reﬁnement runs into two problems. First, 
it leaves unanswered the difﬁcult question of  what constitutes teaching by 
the Church (more on this below). Second, it still doesn’t capture the way 
in which the concept of  Church Doctrine is used. An example illustrates 
both points. Suppose that I am called as gospel doctrine teacher in my 
ward. I then begin teaching in class that Williamsburg, Virginia is located 
on the York-James Peninsula, including in my lesson a detailed discussion 
of  the geography of  the Virginia tidewater. My bishop then instructs me 
to stop, telling me that I should conﬁne my teaching to Church Doctrine. 
Clearly his instructions do not do any violence to the ordinary usage of  
Church Doctrine, even though there is nothing false about my teachings. 
They do suggest, however, that Church Doctrine cannot be understood 
as any truth that is taught in the context of  the Church.
Legal positivism provides a second possible analogy for Church 
Doctrine. According to H.L.A. Hart, an inﬂuential legal positivist, law is a 
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system of  rules. Some rules govern human behavior, for example the rule 
that murder is prohibited. Some rules govern the promulgation and validity 
of  other rules. On this view, law is ultimately deﬁned by what Hart called 
a “rule of  recognition.” 9 This is a rule that allows us to differentiate those 
rules that are law from other rules, such as rules of  manners or the rules 
of  golf, which are not law. For example, in the United Kingdom a statute 
passed by the House of  Commons is law. This is a rule of  recognition. 
Positivism provides a seemingly elegant solution to the problem of  
what is Church Doctrine. All that is necessary is to identify a rule of  
recognition for Church Doctrine. The problem is that as a matter of  social 
understanding it does not appear that any such rule of  recognition exists. It 
is tempting to look to the scriptures and the idea of  canonization as a rule 
of  recognition. On this view, Church Doctrine would consist of  whatever 
the scriptures say. There are at least two problems with this approach. 
First, it is over- and under-inclusive. There are certain things that are very 
clearly Church Doctrine that cannot really be found in the scriptures. For 
example, our current understanding of  the Word of  Wisdom exceeds 
the text of  the Doctrine & Covenants. The very fact that the Word of  
Wisdom is regarded today as a commandment is at odds with the text 
itself, which clearly states that it is not given by way of  commandment 
(see D&C 89:2). The scriptures also contain many teachings that are not 
Church Doctrine. For example, certain aspects of  the text of  the Word 
of  Wisdom – such as the prohibition on meat except in winter or time 
of  famine – are not regarded as normative (see D&C 89:12-13). Likewise, 
Christ’s prohibition on divorce in the Gospel of  Mark does not seem to 
be Church Doctrine (see Mark 10:6-9), to say nothing of  the intricate 
rules found in the Pentateuch.
The second problem with looking only to the scriptures for Church 
Doctrine is the problem of  interpretation. Mormonism begins with a 
rejection of  the sufﬁciency of  scriptural interpretation standing alone. 
After ﬁnding himself  caught up in a war of  words between the rival 
evangelists in Palmyra, Joseph Smith noted that “the teachers of  religion 
of  the different sects understood the same passages of  scripture so 
differently as to destroy all conﬁdence in settling the question by an appeal to the Bible” 
(JS-H 1:11-12; emphasis added). The new revelation of  the Restoration 
came only after the sufﬁciency of  scripture had been rejected. As it now 
stands, Mormons regularly invoke the concept of  Church Doctrine as an 
aid to the interpretation of  scripture. For example, should someone teach 
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that the text of  D&C 89 requires that Mormons become vegetarians; the 
standard response would be, “That is just your interpretation; it is not 
Church Doctrine.” This points, however, to an important function of  
Church Doctrine. It is something that we frequently use to identify which 
interpretations of  scripture are authoritative and which are not. This 
means, however, that Church Doctrine necessarily exceeds the Standard 
Works standing alone.
Finally, one might look to the statements of  General Authorities as 
providing a clear rule of  recognition for Church Doctrine. Joseph Smith, 
however, insisted that a prophet is only a prophet when speaking as a 
prophet. What we lack, however, is a clear criterion for identifying when 
a prophet is speaking as a prophet. For example, should we assume that 
everything uttered in general conference is Church Doctrine? If  so, is 
it because the speakers in general conference are careful to make sure 
that they don’t say anything that contradicts Church Doctrine, or because 
Church Doctrine simply is what is said in general conference? Furthermore, 
is Church Doctrine conﬁned to some set of  public statements by high 
Church leaders? For example, if  the General Handbook of  Instructions 
were modiﬁed so that abstinence from coffee was no longer necessary to 
qualify as worthy for a temple recommend, would such a change constitute 
a shift in Church Doctrine, even if  it was not announced from the pulpit 
in general conference? The fact that we do not have clear answers to 
these questions suggests to me that we lack a clear rule of  recognition 
for what constitutes Church Doctrine. This does not mean, of  course, 
that the words of  scripture and modern prophets are without authority. 
It simply means that a statement does not become Church Doctrine by 
virtue of  being uttered by any particular Church leader or even by virtue 
of  being printed in the Standard Works. Nor does it mean that the various 
potential rules of  recognition that we might propose are wrong per se. All 
of  these rules can help to orient us toward Church Doctrine. However, 
they cannot provide a fool-proof  way of  identifying Church Doctrine in 
every case.
LAW AS INTEGRITY AND CHURCH DOCTRINE
“Law as integrity” provides an attractive alternative to the analogy of  legal positivism. This approach begins with so-called “easy 
cases,” situations where what the law consists of  and what it demands 
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is more or less clear and obvious. For example, we know that the U.S. 
Constitution’s requirement that the President be at least 35 years of  age 
can be identiﬁed as the law without recourse to any elaborate theory of  
what law is. Such obviously true legal propositions abound: Lower courts 
are bound to apply the holdings of  higher courts; the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act clearly forbids a Hilton from refusing to serve a patron because he 
or she is Black; after centuries of  accumulated precedent many common-
law rules, like the requirement that a will have two witnesses, are beyond 
serious question. The vast majority of  legal disputes involve such “easy 
cases.” We only require a theory of  “what is the law?” when we are faced 
with what Ronald Dworkin has called “hard cases.”10 In these situations 
the scope of  the law is unclear and we are hard pressed to identify its 
demands. Dworkin imagines how a perfect judge, who he names Hercules, 
would decide such a case.11 According to Dworkin, Hercules would survey 
the vast mass of  clear and easy law relating to the issue. He would then 
construct an account that makes sense of  all of  this material. Any theory 
of  law must do this because the clear and easy law is binding, hence his 
interpretation must ﬁt and justify it. 
Dworkin gives the example of  the English case of  McLaughlin v. 
O’Brian.12 The case involved a woman who sued a negligent driver for 
damages for emotional distress. The woman was not in the car accident 
and had not been physically injured in any way. Rather, she was called to 
the hospital where she learned that her husband and daughter had been 
killed. Previous English cases had awarded damages for emotional distress 
but only in cases where the plaintiff  had actually witnessed the injury 
or had come upon a loved one’s corpse at the scene of  the accident.13 
The question presented by McLaughlin was whether or not these cases 
authorized damages in a situation where emotional distress was removed 
from the scene of  the accident to the more antiseptic setting of  the 
hospital.
In deciding a case like McLaughlin, Hercules does not simply decide 
whether he believes, all things considered, that recovery for emotional 
distress in this situation is a good idea. Rather he begins with the earlier 
cases. Suppose, for example, that Hercules believes that any recovery for 
emotional distress would be misguided. He thinks that it is a bad policy and 
that the moral arguments in favor of  compensating emotional distress are 
weak. He cannot, however, simply apply this judgment to McLaughlin’s 
case, because the previous decisions by which he is bound clearly reject his 
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position by awarding damages. Nor may he simply hold that the previous 
decisions were mistaken and that from now on no damages for emotional 
distress will be awarded.14 Rather, Hercules must look at the previously 
decided cases and construct the best possible argument that he can to 
justify them. In justifying them, he looks not only at the outcomes in the 
cases, but also to the reasons offered by the previous judges. He must 
also account for these reasons, although in constructing the best possible 
justiﬁcation for the previous cases he will necessarily recharacterize the 
reasoning of  previous judges. Thus the arguments in support of  the 
holdings evolve over time. In McLaughlin, Hercules would draw on the 
best possible understanding that he has of  policy and political morality 
to justify the conclusion that those who witness the death of  a loved one 
should be compensated, and he would then decide if  those arguments 
justify giving the wife and mother of  accident victims compensation when 
she learns of  the deaths in a hospital. Hercules’ interpretation involves 
normative judgments, but it is not simply a matter of  his normative 
judgments. Rather, discovering what the law requires in a particular case 
is a matter of  giving force to the latent normative judgments of  previous, 
controlling precedents. Put another way, to discover the law in a “hard 
case” a judge creates a story that makes sense of  the clearly established 
cases and then ﬁts the new case into that story in a way that places the 
whole in the best possible light.
In my view, thinking of  Church Doctrine as an analogous kind of  
interpretation provides the best account of  how we discover it. The 
advantage of  this view is that it does not require that we have any clear idea 
about the rule of  recognition. It simply requires that we have some easily 
identiﬁable core cases of  Church Doctrine from which we can reason. 
This is precisely the situation in which we ﬁnd ourselves. We can easily 
imagine that Brother Young and Sister Smith have very different opinions 
about the rule of  recognition for Church Doctrine. For example, Brother 
Young might believe that Church Doctrine consists only of  texts formally 
canonized by a vote in general conference, while Sister Smith might regard 
any public sermon by a member of  the Quorum of  the Twelve as Church 
Doctrine. Both of  them agree, however, that it is Church Doctrine that 
Jesus Christ is the savior of  mankind and that Latter-day Saints should not 
drink coffee. When faced with a new question about Church Doctrine, 
rather than trying to determine which of  them has the correct rule of  
recognition they can simply reason on the basis of  clear cases, ﬁtting 
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the new question into a story that will place things in their best possible 
light. More importantly, I think that this is how most Mormons actually 
use the concept of  Church Doctrine. To be sure, Latter-day Saints point 
to authoritative statements in support of  their claim that this or that 
proposition or rule of  conduct is Church Doctrine. However, all of  these 
claims are made against a background of  teachings, experiences, and texts 
that they seek to accommodate and charitably characterize. It is their 
interpretation of  the totality that produces their conclusions about what 
is or is not Church Doctrine.
There are obviously important ways in which Church Doctrine as 
integrity is different than law as integrity. A judge faced with a case does 
not have the luxury of  not resolving the question presented. Once the 
parties have concluded the litigation, the judge is required to declare one 
of  the parties a winner. In centuries gone by a judge could rule dubitante, 
simply declaring that the law was unclear and leaving the case undecided, 
but this is no longer allowed. Accordingly, a jurisprudential theory requires 
that the law be complete in the sense of  providing some deﬁnitive answer 
to any case that can be posed to it. Even in hard cases there are answers, 
and the law is without gaps. Church Doctrine, however, doesn’t labor 
under the same institutional imperatives as the law. Sometimes – often 
– the best interpretation of  Mormon texts, practices, and history will 
be dubitante: We simply don’t know. Even here, however, the process of  
interpretation will discipline our ignorance. Mormon texts, practices, and 
history will foreclose certain answers even while they make other answers 
more likely, all the while not deﬁnitively laying the matter to rest. Hence, on 
some questions – such as the location of  towns in the Virginia tidewater 
– Church Doctrine is simply silent. On other questions, however, the 
answer might be something like, “Well, under Church Doctrine there are 
a couple of  possible answers…”
For example, the precise meaning of  the term “intelligence” as it is 
used in the scriptures is notoriously vague. Bruce R. McConkie suggested 
that “intelligence” consisted of  some sort of  pre-sentient stuff  from 
which spirits are organized.15 B. H. Roberts thought that “intelligences” 
were the eternal, self-existent, self-aware core of  the spirit that could 
neither be created nor destroyed.16 Perhaps most esoterically, Orson 
Pratt suggested that “intelligence” was an elemental ﬂuid of  divinity that 
pervaded to a greater and lesser extent the entire universe.17 (Blake Ostler 
has recently articulated a philosophically sophisticated modern version of  
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Pratt’s position.18) I take it that none of  these positions can be identiﬁed 
as the authoritative approach of  Church Doctrine to the question. They 
all ﬁt and justify Mormon texts, practices, and history to a greater or lesser 
extent. On the other hand Church Doctrine does foreclose certain theories 
of  intelligence. For example, the consistent rejection of  the doctrine of  ex 
nihilo creation by Mormon scriptures and authorities would foreclose the 
idea that Church Doctrine can accommodate the view that “intelligence” 
refers to some spirit substance created from nothing by God through an 
act of  divine ﬁat.
The question of  whether Diet Coke is prohibited by the Word of  
Wisdom provides an example of  how we discover Church Doctrine. We 
start with the brute fact that we all agree that the Word of  Wisdom is 
Church Doctrine and that it forbids drinking coffee, tea, and alcohol. 
What would be the best story that one could tell about this? One story 
would be to say that it is a health code designed to prohibit the ingestion 
of  bad substances.19 Thus we look at alcohol and caffeine and use them 
as touchstones for Word of  Wisdom compliance. On this view, chocolate 
and Diet Coke, both of  which contain caffeine, are out. There are a 
number of  problems with this interpretation. For example, the schedule 
of  prohibited substances is strangely random from a purely health-
oriented point of  view. Why condemn excessive meat consumption 
but not excessive sugar consumption? Why explicitly include relatively 
harmless substances like tea or coffee but not narcotics? One might offer 
the argument that in the nineteenth century when Section 89 was given 
they didn’t have such drugs. This, however, is historically inaccurate. 
The nineteenth century was well acquainted with narcotics like opium. 
Furthermore, the current interpretation of  “hot drinks” as meaning tea 
and coffee (but not herb tea) didn’t gel until the twentieth century, so it 
is not clear why nineteenth-century practice should control. Given these 
difﬁculties, one could conclude that the bad-substances interpretation 
doesn’t provide the best account of  the rules. A better account is that the 
prohibition is meant as a reminder or symbol of  the covenant that I make 
with God and an open-ended admonition to be healthy. This explains 
the seemingly arbitrary schedule of  prohibited substances. As symbols 
they are arbitrary in the same way that using the shape “A” to designate 
the sound “ahhh” is arbitrary. It also explains the rise of  the Word of  
Wisdom as a central part of  Mormon identity in the 1930s. As outward 
reminders of  Mormons’ status as a “peculiar people” in the form of  
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things like polygamy or the United Order retreated in the face of  intense 
outside pressure, the Word of  Wisdom provided a workable mark of  the 
covenant. On this reading, however, the prohibition on hot drinks cannot 
be reduced to a prohibition on caffeine that then extends to Diet Coke. 
It does suggest, however, that one should avoid consumption – including 
the consumption of  Diet Coke – that is bad for one’s health.
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF CHURCH DOCTRINE AS 
INTEGRITY: HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
This interpretation of  the Word of  Wisdom may or may not be correct, but it does illustrate how applying an interpretive approach 
to the problem of  Church Doctrine would work. This approach also casts 
light on two persistent intellectual issues within Mormonism: historical 
interpretation and the role of  personal judgment in following Church 
Doctrine. The Word of  Wisdom example illustrates how an interpretive 
approach makes sense of  history and change in Church Doctrine. The 
notion of  Church Doctrine as a story whose totality must be accounted 
for with a new chapter ﬁts in nicely with Mormon ideas of  continuing 
revelation (e.g. A. of  F. 9) and with the reality of  evolution in Mormon 
thought. 20 The requirement that the story be told in the way that places 
it in the best possible light also accounts for the persistent tendency of  
Mormons to understand their own history in the rosiest possible terms. 
Generally, this approach to Mormon history has been characterized as 
simple apologetics and chalked up to naiveté or perhaps dishonesty.21 
Seeing the discovery of  Church Doctrine as an exercise in interpretation, 
however, suggests that the goal of  much of  Mormon discussion of  
history is neither history nor apologetics. Rather it is a search for what is 
normative and what is not. In seeking to understand their past in the best 
possible light, Mormons are trying to understand which parts of  that past 
have a claim on them and which parts do not. The stories function less 
as historical explanations or even “faith promoting” narratives than as an 
exercise in the discovery of  Church Doctrine. 
This is not meant as a historical apology for traditional Mormon history. 
No doubt the search for the normative in Mormon history obscures 
a great deal and creates a distorted view of  the past. If  our goal is to 
understand fully – in so far as we are able – the nature of  historical events, 
then we will need to consider and offer interpretations that will not ﬁt into 
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the narrative of  Church Doctrine. Neither historical explanations nor the 
doctrinal search for the normative in the Mormon past are illegitimate. 
They are, however, different sorts of  endeavors, although Mormons are 
seldom clear – even in their own minds – about which exercise they are 
engaged in.22 For example, the explanation for the twentieth-century 
rise in the importance of  the Word of  Wisdom offered above uses the 
interpretation of  the past as a way of  discovering the current contours 
of  normativity. It may or may not be an accurate or compelling historical 
explanation. Indeed, it obscures things that a fully realized historical 
explanation should consider. For example, a purely historical explanation 
would take into account Heber J. Grant’s life-long afﬁliation with the 
temperance movement and his failure to keep Utah from casting the 
deciding vote to repeal Prohibition.23 It would also consider the role that 
the economic imperatives of  pioneer Utah played in the emphasis on the 
Word of  Wisdom.24 And so on. However, despite superﬁcial appearances, 
my interpretation of  the Word of  Wisdom is not offered as a historical 
account at all. Rather it is seeking to understand history only in a very 
narrow and speciﬁc way, namely as a part of  the current structure of  
authoritative Church Doctrine. To paraphrase Dworkin:
[The discovery of  Church Doctrine] begins in the present and 
pursues the past only so far as and in the way its contemporary 
focus dictates. It does not aim to recapture, even for present 
[Church Doctrine], the ideals or practical purposes of  the 
[authorities] who ﬁrst created it. It aims rather to justify what they 
did (sometimes including what they said) in an overall story worth 
telling now, a story with a complex claim: that present practice can 
be organized by and justiﬁed in principles sufﬁciently attractive to 
provide an honorable future.25
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF CHURCH DOCTRINE AS 
INTEGRITY: OBEDIENCE AND PERSONAL JUDGMENT
This approach also provides a more nuanced understanding of  the relationship between individual judgment and following Church 
Doctrine. To see how, we must understand that on this view Church 
Doctrine is inherently contestable. This doesn’t mean that doctrinal 
questions are without correct answers.26 Indeed the interpretive approach 
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necessarily assumes that many aspects of  Church Doctrine are clear. Rather 
it means that we always can have disagreements about certain aspects 
of  what Church Doctrine requires and that the only way of  doctrinally 
settling these disagreements will be by resort to complex arguments about 
the best possible story to be told. It is important to understand that when 
I say that certain aspects of  Church Doctrine are inherently contestable, I 
am not talking about disagreements over whether Church Doctrine is true 
or whether it should be followed. Rather I am talking about disagreements 
over the content of  Church Doctrine itself. This inherent contestability is 
illustrated by the fact that the Church’s solution to the practical problems 
created by doctrinal disputes is not a clear and mechanical rule for 
discovering what is Church Doctrine. We lack an intellectual formula for 
escaping the demands of  interpretation. Rather the coping mechanisms 
are essentially moral and institutional. 
Morally, we are to discuss Church Doctrine with charity and unity, 
avoiding “contention.” In the Book of  Mormon, the risen Christ teaches, 
“For verily, verily I say unto you, he that hath the spirit of  contention is 
not of  me, but is of  the devil, who is the father of  contention, and he 
stirreth up the hearts of  men to content with anger, one with another” (3 
Ne. 11:28-29). This is not a philosophical Rosetta Stone that allows us to 
transparently identify authoritative Church Doctrine. This fact suggests 
that the primary danger of  the contestability of  Church Doctrine is not 
epistemic. It is not that we will be mistaken. Rather, it is moral and social. 
It is the danger of  rancor, discord, and a loss of  unity. Accordingly, we 
have a solution in the form of  a moral injunction about social interactions 
– in this case doctrinal discussions – rather than an intellectual method for 
resolving doctrinal disputes.
In addition to a morality of  doctrinal discussion, we have institutional 
solutions to the practical difﬁculties of  doctrinal disagreements. Return 
once again to the initial disagreement between Sister Smith and Brother 
Young. Imagine that Sister Smith is called as a gospel doctrine teacher 
and begins vociferously teaching her anti-evolution views during class. 
Brother Young suggests to her that she should stop teaching her opinions 
as Church Doctrine. Sister Smith indignantly replies that her views on 
the age of  the earth are Church Doctrine, insisting that she holds them 
precisely for this reason. Both parties take the dispute to their bishop. He 
asks that Sister Smith conﬁne her lesson more closely to the text of  the 
assigned scriptures. Such a solution to Sister Smith’s and Brother Young’s 
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doctrinal disagreement is entirely institutional. Indeed, it needn’t take a 
doctrinal position at all on the resolution of  the dispute. The bishop’s 
decision controls in this situation not because he has privileged access 
to Church Doctrine per se but simply because he is the bishop. In this 
sense, the hierarchy of  the Church, with its accompanying notions of  
stewardship and jurisdiction, renders a theory that incontestably identiﬁes 
Church Doctrine unnecessary. 27 The success of  the ethical and institution 
methods of  coping with doctrinal disagreement underscores the inherent 
contestability of  Church Doctrine. Given the proper attitude and 
institutional structure, the contestability seems to be something that we 
can live with. Nevertheless, the contestability remains.
The source of  this inherent contestability lies in the fact that we can 
only discover Church Doctrine by ﬁnding the best possible story that can 
be told about the texts, practices, and history of  Mormonism. Not only 
is this process of  interpretation complicated, but the principle of  charity 
means that it necessarily involves normative judgments that are inherently 
contestable. This does not mean, however, that discovering Church 
Doctrine is a free-wheeling exercise in normative reasoning. Such a view 
fails to appreciate the difference between judging what would make the best 
story about a particular set of  phenomena and simply judging what would 
be best. Discovering Church Doctrine requires that we make sense of  
clear instances of  Church Doctrine and their context (contemporary and 
historical). This interpretive requirement forecloses certain possibilities. 
For example, suppose that I come to believe – after careful consideration 
– that the best way of  memorializing gospel covenants in our lives would 
be to eat only white food, since whiteness denotes purity and ingestion 
is a powerful way of  symbolizing how we take the gospel into our very 
being. (Something like this view was common among early Christians.) 
Whatever the merits of  this practice, it is not Church Doctrine. It does 
not purport to offer an interpretation of  the teachings and practices of  
the Church. In contrast, the interpretation of  the Word of  Wisdom that 
I offered above assumes that the Word of  Wisdom is an authority that 
forecloses, for example, the modest and healthy consumption of  wine.
The precise nature of  the link between the authority of  Church Doctrine 
and the need to tell the best possible story about it is complicated. The 
search for the best possible story is not offered as an account of  the 
authority of  Church Doctrine. It does not aim at fully justifying it. Such a 
justiﬁcation must come from elsewhere, and its nature is beyond the scope 
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of  this essay.28 Sufﬁce it to say that the source of  the authority of  Church 
Doctrine likely lies in covenants, priesthood power, the privileged access of  
prophets to the divine, and the needs of  the saints as a community. These 
are all normative grounds separate from the particular stories that we tell 
about particular doctrines. (Although to be sure, the grounds of  Church 
Doctrine’s authority no doubt have their role to play in understanding this 
or that question about its contours.) However, the authority of  Church 
Doctrine does require that we look at it in the best possible light. Such an 
approach acknowledges that Church Doctrine is something with a claim 
upon us, something normative.
Hence, following Church Doctrine does not constitute an abdication 
of  independent moral judgment, as has been so often suggested. 
Following Church Doctrine does mean subordinating one’s independent 
substantive judgments on an issue to which Church Doctrine speaks. Yet 
understanding what Church Doctrine requires is not a mechanical process. 
Acknowledging the authority of  Church Doctrine means committing 
oneself  to discovering its demands. Yet this process of  discovery will 
necessarily involve making independent judgments about what provides 
the best possible story to be told about the totality of  known doctrines. 
Put another way, independent of  its legitimacy or justiﬁcation, discovering 
the bounds of  authority is at least in part a normative inquiry that requires 
our independent judgment. Even in obedience we “must be as gods, 
knowing good and evil” (Moses 4:11).29
CONCLUSION
My goal in this essay has not been to reform or critique the way that Mormons use the concept of  Church Doctrine. Rather, I have tried 
to elucidate what I take to be the underlying logic of  their practice. Hence, 
the interpretive approach that I draw by analogy from the philosophy of  
law is not offered as something new. Rather, I think that on this point 
Mormons are rather like the man who discovers that he has been speaking 
prose all his life. Analogizing the question of  how we know if  something 
is Church Doctrine to the question of  how we know if  something is law, 
however, does allow us to bring certain issues into sharper focus. First, 
it allows us to recognize that we lack a rule of  recognition for what is 
Church Doctrine. Second, it provides us with a way of  understanding why 
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this is not a serious theoretical objection to our current practice. Finally, 
by revealing the inherently interpretive nature of  discovering Church 
Doctrine, it hopefully sheds light on some of  our other institutional and 
theoretical practices.
Nathan B. Oman is Assistant Professor at the Marshall-Wythe School of  Law at 
The College of  William & Mary
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